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Rational Profiling in America’s Airports 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
America was indelibly changed on September 11, 2001. Early that 
morning, American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 
departed Boston for Los Angeles. Both aircraft were hijacked by 
members of Usama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda terrorist network. All nineteen 
hijackers were male, between twenty and forty-five years old, and of 
Middle Eastern descent.1 Armed with box-cutters, hijackers took control 
of these aircraft, altered the flight courses, and crashed them into the twin 
towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. That same 
morning, American Airlines Flight 77 departed Washington’s Dulles 
Airport for Los Angeles, was hijacked, and crashed into the Pentagon. 
United Airlines Flight 93 left Newark Airport for San Francisco, was 
hijacked and crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.2 An estimated 
3,000 people were killed in these attacks.3 
Before September 11, the 1983 truck bombings of U.S. and French 
military barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, which claimed a total of 295 lives, 
stood as the deadliest act of terrorism in United States history. The 
September 11 attacks “produced casualty figures more than ten times 
those of the 1983 barracks attacks.”4 
September 11 underscored many of the trends in international 
terrorism identified in recent years by the FBI, CIA, and other 
intelligence-gathering agencies. The attacks were the first suicide attacks 
 
 1. Federation for American Immigration Reform, World Trade Center and Pentagon 
Terrorist’s Identity and Immigration Status (last visited Oct.10, 2001) 
http://www.fairus.org/html/04178101.htm. 
 2. U.S. Department of Justice, Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft Sept. 11, 2001 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2002) http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/agcrisisremarks.htm. 
 3. The count of September 11 victims has continued to change more than one year since the 
attacks. As of October 7, 2002, the “official toll” kept by the New York City Police Department 
listed 2,797 victims. See The Sacramento Bee, World Trade Center victims list drops below 2,800 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2002) http://www.sacbee.com/ 24hour/special_reports/terrorism/story/565774p-
4447662c.html. The number of victims at the Pentagon and in Pennsylvania have remained at 184 
and 40, respectively. See Official count of victims of Sept. 11 attacks (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) 
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/nation/1570718. 
 4. FBI, Statement for the Record of Dale L. Watson, Executive Assistant Director 
Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, on The Terrorist Threat 
Confronting the United States  (Feb. 6, 2002) http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/ 
watson020602.htm. 
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by international terrorists within the United States.5 The attacks 
demonstrated an apparent shift in some terrorist organizations from 
formally structured groups to loosely affiliated, decentralized cells. 
September 11 also exemplified a change in tactics and methodologies 
among international terrorists to focus on producing mass casualties. 6 
Contrary to their intended purpose, the September 11 attacks 
galvanized the United States and its resolve to combat terrorism. Military 
operations against Al-Qaeda elements in Afghanistan began within 
weeks of September 11, and resulted in the nearly complete destruction 
of the Taliban infrastructure. President Bush signed the “Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act” into law in November 2001.7  This law 
makes airport security personnel federal employees, implements Sky 
Marshal programs, and creates a new Federal Transportation Security 
Administration (FTSA) to oversee the security operations of all modes of 
commercial passenger transportation.8  As of October 1, 2002, the U.S. 
Department of Justice had designated 39 groups as “terrorist 
organizations” and frozen the assets of 62 organizations that support 
terrorism.9 
Despite the success of these measures according to the FBI, the 
threat of terrorism represents “a significant challenge to the United States 
for the foreseeable future.”10 Terrorists will likely continue to “focus on 
attacks that yield significant destruction and high casualties, thus 
maximizing worldwide media attention and public anxiety.”11 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. The threat of domestic terrorism (acts perpetrated within the United States by U.S. 
citizens, without foreign direction) is no less significant. Between 1980 and 2000, the FBI recorded 
335 incidents or suspected incidents of terrorism in this country. Of these, 247 were attributed to 
domestic terrorists, while 88 were determined to be international in origin. Id. 
 7. Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 105, 115 Stat. 597, 607-08 (2001). 
 8. Robert Longley, New Airport Security Measures (Nov. 18, 2001)  
http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/ aa111801a.htm. 
 9. Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft (last visited November 8, 2002) 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/ 100102agremarkstousattorneysconference.htm. America’s 
responses have not been purely punitive. Private donations to the victims of the September 11 
attacks have totaled more than $1 billion dollars. See The September 11th Fund (last visited Mar. 26, 
2002) http://www.uwnyc.org/sep11/; See also United Way, of America (last visited Mar. 26, 2002) 
http://national.unitedway.org/index.cfm; CNN, Red Cross Unveils Plan for September 11 Funds 
(Jan. 31, 2002) http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/31/ rec.liberty.fund/. Between October 2001 and 
March 1, 2002, the World Food Program delivered 333,000 tons of food to Afghanistan. See The 
Iowa Channel, War on Terrorism: At a Glance  (Mar. 26, 2002) http://www.theiowachannel. 
com/news/960658/detail.html. In the months following September 11, the United States sent ten 
shipments of medical supplies to Afghanistan, enough to support 100,000 people for three months. 
Id. The United States also provided nearly $4.4 million to provide food, shelter, clothing, and 
medicine and school supplies through America’s Fund for Afghan Children. Id. 
 10. FBI, supra note 4, at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/watson020602.htm. 
 11. Id. 
MACDONALD 5 - MACRO 2/5/2003  10:17 AM 
113] RATIONAL PROFILING 115 
This paper focuses on legal issues surrounding security measures at 
airports, measures that could have prevented the September 11 tragedy 
and will serve to protect against similar attacks in the future. Particularly, 
this paper seeks to answer the following question: Should the FTSA 
incorporate consideration of race, gender, and age into airport profiling 
procedures?  Such a suggestion raises legitimate concerns and 
constitutional arguments.12  “Racial profiling of any kind is anathema to 
our criminal justice system.”13 The alternative argument, however, seems 
equally compelling. “Today we’re at war with a terror network that just 
killed [3,000] innocents and has anonymous agents in our country 
planning more slaughter. Are we really supposed to ignore the one 
identifiable fact we know about them?”14 
II.  RICHARD KIMBLE: A PROFILING EXAMPLE 
In the 1993 movie The Fugitive,15 Harrison Ford played Dr. Richard 
Kimble, an affluent Chicago surgeon who returns home one night to find 
his wife murdered and her murderer – a one-armed man – escaping. 
Kimble is charged with the crime, convicted, sent to prison, then  escapes 
and spends the rest of the movie tracking down the one-armed man using 
a fairly straightforward methodology. First, he compares the type of 
prosthetic arm he had seen the murderer wearing to a hospital’s database 
and compiles a list of people who had been fitted with such a device. 
Kimble then uses other factors (such as the age of the patient, whether 
the prosthetic arm was on the right or left-hand, etc.) to narrow the list to 
five candidates. He then tracks down each candidate, one of whom turns 
out to be his wife’s murderer. The one-armed man is arrested and Kimble 
exonerated. 
Perhaps Richard Kimble was on to something. Imagine what would 
have happened had Kimble conducted his search without considering 
“the one identifiable fact [he] knew about [the murderer].”16 He would 
have spent years searching the entire population of Chicago, two-armed 
 
 12. Much of this paper will compare airport profiling to incidents of racial profiling, 
primarily because legal issues surrounding racial discrimination predominate over the relatively 
minor issues of age discrimination (targeting adults) and gender discrimination (targeting males). 
Nevertheless, the emphasis of this paper deals with incorporating scrutiny of all three characteristics 
(race, gender, and age) into airport profiling techniques. 
 13. Martinez v. Mt. Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d 780, 782 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 14. Michael Kinsley, Racial Profiling at the Airport, SLATE (last visited Sept. 28, 2001)  
http://slate.msn.com/?id=116347. This article stated there were 6,000 September 11 victims, but 
more recent estimates have lowered the casualty count to slightly more than 3,000. See The Iowa 
Channel, supra note 9, at http://www.theiowachannel.com/news/960658/detail.html. 
 15. The Fugitive (Warner Bros. 1993). 
 16. Kinsley, supra note 14, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=116347. 
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and one-armed alike, male and female, young and old, black, white, 
Hispanic, Asian, and so on. Faced with such a daunting task, he likely 
would have given up his search  and turned himself in to the U.S. 
Marshals. 
Consider this example in light of the September 11 attacks. All 
nineteen hijackers were adult males of middle-eastern ethnicity.17  What 
might happen if America ignores the identifiable facts we know about 
hijackers?  The FTSA must decide whether to modify current profiling 
procedures to include consideration of race, gender, and age. The 
following sections will discuss some of the legal arguments for and 
against such a policy, compare and contrast airport profiling to other 
instances of profiling, and explain current airport profiling procedures. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF PROFILING 
Modifying airport profiling procedures to include scrutiny of race, 
gender, and age has the potential to impact fundamental constitutional 
rights. Such a possibility requires us to consider the constitutional and 
legal ramifications of profiling before such changes are implemented. 
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the creation or enforcement of 
“any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”18 The Equal Protection 
Clause “prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on 
considerations such as race” and is the “the constitutional basis for 
objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws.”19 Several 
recent cases have discussed racial profiling, particularly where police use 
race as the sole factor in pulling over black motorists. 20 
 
 17. Fifteen of the September 11 terrorists were from Saudi Arabia, two were from the United 
Arab Republic, and the remaining two were from Egypt and Lebanon, respectively. See 
http://www.fairus.org/html/04178101.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2002). 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The modifications to airport profiling procedures 
discussed in this paper could have an impact on any airline passenger whose combined 
characteristics (race, gender, age, method of purchasing ticket, etc.) warrant heightened scrutiny. 
Since both U.S. citizens as well as non-citizens could incur such scrutiny, discussion of Fourteenth 
Amendment implications is relevant. 
 19. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Despite assumptions to the contrary, the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and requirement of 
“probable cause” do not appear to apply to these circumstances. See Id. C.f. U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975), which held that the Fourth Amendment “applies to all seizures of the 
person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.” 
 20. This issue is commonly called “DWB” – “driving while black.” See Illinois v. Wardlow, 
528 U.S. 119 (2000); Chavez v. Ill. St. Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Montero 
Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000); Martinez v. Mt. Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d 780, 782 
(N.D. Ill. 2000); U.S. v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D. Mass. 1998); Chavez v. Ill. St. Police, 251 
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Judicial consensus, expressed in varying degrees of emphasis, is that 
“the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on 
considerations such as race.”21 Although use of race and ethnicity for 
such purposes has been severely limited,22 such use has never been 
precluded: 
All legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial 
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such 
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject 
them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may 
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism 
never can.23 
Reliance on “racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most 
searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with 
constitutional guarantees.”24 The qualified language of these decisions 
demonstrates judicial recognition of circumstances where profiling race 
may have “probative value”25 and, having passed “a most searching 
examination,”26 be utilized by law enforcement and security personnel. 
Did the September 11 attacks, carried out by Middle Eastern adult 
males, create such circumstances? Could their race, gender, and age have 
had probative value had such factors been included in airport profiling 
procedures? Does the threat of further terrorist attacks warrant such 
measures? Answers to these questions may be found by examining 
historical examples of mandated restrictions on civil liberties during 
wartime, as well as contemporary instances of racial profiling. 
A.  Clarification of Terms: Discrimination and Profiling 
Discussions of race and similar “hot-button issues”27 are often 
hindered by divergent interpretations of certain words or phrases. For 
example, the term “discrimination,” as applied to most legal issues, is 
frequently perceived as having an inherently negative connotation. The 
Supreme Court recent noted, “many [traffic] stops never lead to an arrest, 
which further exacerbates the perceptions of discrimination felt by racial 
 
F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001). For further discussion regarding DWB, see infra p. 17. 
 21. Whren v. U.S.,517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
 22. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 23. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 24. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1134, (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 
267, 273, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986))). 
 25. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1134. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Corpwatch, Bush Urged to Support Anti-Racism Summit (July 31, 2001) 
http://www.corpwatch.org/bulletins/PBD.jsp?articleid=408. 
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minorities and people living in high crime areas.”28 The unspoken 
assumption is that discrimination based on race is always suspect. 
Indeed, some courts feel “it is critical that our legal system assist in the 
elimination of all racial discrimination. We must constantly strive to 
ensure that race plays no role in the day-to-day operation of our justice 
system.”29 
Similarly, “racial profiling” is often understood to have a negative 
implication, which is that race (or whatever status is being 
“discriminated” against or “profiled”) is the only factor justifying 
increased scrutiny by police or other security officials. For example, the 
court in Lemon v. MTS noted that “[d]efendants’ employee . . . utilized 
racial profiling as the sole basis for detaining plaintiff.”30 The court 
understood “racial profiling” to mean that race was the only 
consideration used in that case. 
Employment-related matters are another area of law involving 
frequent allegations of discrimination. Although race-based 
discrimination in employment is immediately suspect, some scholars 
have noted that it may be rational in some circumstances.31  As a rule, 
“the law prohibits even such ‘rational’ discrimination because of this 
society’s long history of racial injustice and the harmful effects of race-
based decisions.”32  However, the law does not always require an ipso 
facto rejection of discrimination. “Rational discrimination against 
persons with disabilities is constitutionally permissible in a way that 
rational discrimination against religious practices is not.”33   
Absolutist interpretation of terms such as “profiling” and 
“discrimination” is unwarranted, because racial discrimination, as well as 
other forms of discrimination, is not unconstitutional on its face. 
Virtually every major statement on racial discrimination or racial 
profiling is qualified or limited in some sense. “Racial discriminations 
are in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited.”34 
“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by 
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded 
 
 28. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 133 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 29. Martinez v. Mt. Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d 780, 781 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (emphasis added). 
 30. Lemon v. MTS, 2001 WL 872639 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
 31. See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (1976); Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 
513, 516 (1987). 
 32. Pauline Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections 
for a Brave New Workplace, 96 NWULR 1497, 1518 (Summer, 2002). 
 33. Erickson v. Board of Governors of St. Coll. and Univ. for N.E. Ill., 207 F.3d 945, 951 
(7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). 
 34. Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (emphasis added). 
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upon the doctrine of equality.”35 “All legal restrictions which curtail the 
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect . . . [and] 
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”36 The law can and 
does accommodate a distinction between legally permissible “rational” 
discrimination and impermissible antagonistic discrimination. 
“Antidiscrimination laws are not predicated upon the existence of 
economically ‘rational’ discrimination; the problem that exists and which 
such laws target is, to a large extent, stubborn but irrational prejudice.”37 
Such a distinction is vital when discussing airport profiling. For 
example, racial profiling is “generally understood to mean the improper 
use of race as a basis for taking law enforcement action.”38 This 
unspoken generalization is sometimes harmful, because failure to 
acknowledge or articulate the distinction between “proper” and 
“improper” discrimination leads to a fading of that important difference. 
Given the urgent need to improve security at our airports, this distinction 
must be clarified and brought to the forefront of any discussions 
regarding profiling. 
Many arguments posited against profiling rely on a blurring of the 
line between prejudicial, animus-based discrimination and measured, 
rational, controlled profiling. “If ‘racial profiling’ means anything 
specific at all, it means rational discrimination: racial discrimination with 
a non-racist rationale.”39 Profiling or other discriminatory measures 
which use race as the sole factor are virtually useless from a practical 
point of view. But measures which consider multiple factors, including 
race, gender, and age, may be justified in certain circumstances. Our 
judicial system has recognized that extremely urgent situations – such as 
wartime – may require restrictions on civil liberties that would normally 
be facially unconstitutional.40 
B.  A “Clear and Present Danger”? 
During World War I, Congress passed the Espionage Act, which 
forbade speech inciting insubordination or refusal to serve in the armed 
forces of the United States.41 A number of subsequent cases resulted in 
 
 35. Id. (emphasis added). 
 36. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (emphasis added). 
 37. Lam v. University of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). 
 38. Chavez v. Illinois. St. Police, 251 F.3d 612, 620 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
 39. Kinsley, supra note 14, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=116347. 
 40. See infra B. “A ‘Clear and Present danger,’” ? which discusses this issue in more detail. 
 41. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. XI, 40 Stat. 228-30, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
611-33 (1925). 
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the “Clear and Present Danger” test.42 Although those cases centered on 
the First Amendment right to free speech, the reasoning from them can 
be applied to our current situation: 
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present 
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has 
a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a 
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are 
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so 
long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by 
any constitutional right.43 
Does the current situation facing America – the ongoing threat of 
terrorism – justify the inclusion of race, gender, and age in profiling 
procedures at airports and other ports of entry? Are such measures 
proportional in “proximity and degree” to the danger of terrorist 
hijackings? Our society has gone to great lengths to avoid facing the 
painful truth that, in some circumstances, race can have probative value. 
A recent article in The Atlantic summarized the situation rather well: 
The mathematical probability that a randomly chosen Arab passenger 
might attempt a mass-murder-suicide hijacking—while tiny—is 
considerably higher than the probability that a randomly chosen white, 
black, Hispanic, or Asian passenger might do the same. In 
constitutional-law parlance, while racial profiling may be 
presumptively unconstitutional, that presumption is overcome in the 
case of airline passengers, because the government has a compelling 
interest in preventing mass-murder-suicide hijackings, and because 
close scrutiny of Arab-looking people is narrowly tailored to protect 
that interest.44 
America faces a “clear and present danger” of hijackers taking 
control of airplanes and either killing passengers or using these aircraft 
as flying bombs. All nineteen terrorists involved in the September 11 
attacks belonged to the “Al-Qaeda terrorist network headed by Usama 
Bin Laden [which has] clearly emerged as the most urgent threat to U.S. 
interests.”45 These hijackers were exclusively adult males of Middle 
Eastern ethnicity.46 
 
 42. See Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919); 
and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 625, 632 (1925). 
 43. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 44. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Case for Using Racial Profiling at Airports, ATLANTIC (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2001) http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2001-09-25.htm. 
 45. FBI, supra note 4, at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/watson020602.htm. 
 46. Federation for American Immigration Reform, supra note 1, at http://www.fairus.org/ 
html/04178101.htm. 
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America must eliminate this danger in such a way as to minimize the 
impact on the civil liberties of minority groups such as OMEAs (people 
who are “of middle eastern appearance”47) while maximizing our 
opportunity to prevent similar attacks in the future. The decision to 
include consideration of race, gender, and age in airport profiling must 
not be based on animus or used as a pretext to target a specific ethnic 
group. Nevertheless, America must also consider whether the current 
emergent circumstances warrant adopting security measures that could 
be otherwise construed as infringing on civil liberties. 
C.  Examples of Questionable Discrimination 
America’s checkered history of race relations no doubt contributes to 
its hesitancy to adopt security measures that, though initially well-
intentioned, might eventually become a pretext for inappropriate 
discrimination against minorities. Some of our country’s most regrettable 
episodes occurred during attempts to shore up national security, 
including the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 and Civil War measures 
such as President Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.48 
Implementing a profiling system that includes consideration of race, 
gender, and age must be done with the standards of “rigid scrutiny”49 
mandated by the Supreme Court. 50 
This section examines two instances of race-based discrimination in 
our nation’s history: the Japanese internment camps during World War II 
and the more recent instances of “driving while black.”51 This section 
also attempts to identify differences between these events and the 
modified profiling procedures that could be implemented in airports. 
These fundamental differences, both in rationale and implementation, 
distinguish airport profiling from the unfortunate discrimination faced by 
Japanese-Americans during World War II. 
 
 47. John Derbyshire, At First Glance: Racial Profiling, Burning Hotter, NAT’L REV. ONLINE  
(visited Oct. 5, 2001) http://www.nationalreview.com/derbyshire/derbyshire100501.shtml. 
 48. Alien Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570; Sedition Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 
§ 1, 1 Stat. 596; see also Ken Armstrong, Many Fear Loss of Freedoms, CHI. TRIB. (Visited Sept. 
16, 2001) http://www.chicagotribune.com/ news/specials/chi-0109160286sep16.story?coll=chi-
newsspecials-hed. 
 49. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 50. As columnist Stuart Taylor noted in The Atlantic, “The emergency measures adopted 
now could be with us for decades, because this emergency is not going away. So we’d better be 
careful. History is replete with hasty emergency legislation that we later came to regret—from the 
Alien and Sedition Acts to the detention camps for Japanese-Americans—and with abuses of the 
new powers years later by officials whose invocations of national security proved overblown or even 
fraudulent.”  Taylor, supra note 44, at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2001-09-25.htm. 
 51. Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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1.  Japanese internment during World War II 
On December 8, 1941, one day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor by 
a Japanese air force, Congress declared war against Japan. Two months 
later, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, 
which stated, “the successful prosecution of the war requires every 
possible protection against . . . sabotage.”52 This order authorized the 
Secretary of War to prescribe military areas “from which any or all 
persons may be excluded.”53 In February, 1942, General J.L. DeWitt, 
Military Commander of the Western Defense Command, issued the first 
of two proclamations. The first proclamation established “military areas 
and zones” comprising “the southern part of Arizona [and] all the coastal 
region of the three Pacific Coast states.”54 The second proclamation 
issued weeks later expanded these areas.55 
President Roosevelt then issued Executive Order 9102 establishing 
the “War Relocation Authority.”56 Under these authorities, an estimated 
120,000 Japanese internees – two-thirds of who were United States 
citizens57 – were removed from America’s west coast, home to many 
military bases and manufacturing plants. These areas were considered 
vulnerable to Japanese attack.58 President Roosevelt also appointed a 
commission to evaluate “what, if any, dereliction . . . in the American 
chain of command that allowed the Japanese to take the Americans 
completely by surprise.”59 This Commission found evidence of extensive 
espionage conducted prior the attack on Pearl Harbor.60 
Numerous lawsuits were filed as a result of these forced relocations. 
In Hirabayashi v. United States, an American-born Japanese man 
 
 52. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 FR 1407, 1942 WL 4050 (Pres.); see also Hirabayashi v. U.S., 
320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943). 
 53. Id. at 86. 
 54. Id. at 86-87. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and 
a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 75 (1998). 
 58. Declan McCullagh, Why Liberty Suffers in Wartime, WIRED NEWS  (Sept. 24, 2001) 
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,47051,00.html. 
 59. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME, 189 
(Alfred A. Knopf 1998). 
 60. Id. at 189-90, which states:”There were . . . Japanese spies on the Island of Oahu [some 
of whom] were Japanese consular agents and others were persons having no open relations with the 
Japanese foreign service. These spies collected, and through various channels transmitted, 
information to the Japanese Empire respecting the military and naval establishments and dispositions 
on the Island . . . [The Japanese knew] the exact location of vital air fields, hangars, and other 
structures. They also knew accurately where certain important naval vessels would be berthed. Their 
fliers had the most detailed maps, courses, and bearings, so that each could attack a given vessel or 
field. Each seems to have been given a specified mission.” 
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disobeyed the curfew requirement imposed by the military pursuant to 
President Roosevelt’s executive order.61 Although the Court recognized 
that racial discrimination is “by [its] very nature odious to a free 
people,”62 it upheld the constitutionality of these measures: 
[T]he danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of 
threatened invasion, calls upon the military authorities to scrutinize 
every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of populations in the danger 
areas. Because racial discriminations are in most circumstances 
irrelevant and therefore prohibited, it by no means follows that, in 
dealing with the perils of war, Congress and the Executive are wholly 
precluded from taking into account those facts and circumstances 
which are relevant to measures for our national defense and for the 
successful prosecution of the war, and which may in fact place citizens 
of one ancestry in a different category from others . . . The adoption by 
Government, in the crisis of war and of threatened invasion, of 
measures for the public safety, based upon the recognition of facts and 
circumstances which indicate that a group of one national extraction 
may menace that safety more than others, is not wholly beyond the 
limits of the Constitution and is not to be condemned merely because in 
other and in most circumstances racial distinctions are irrelevant.63 
A similar situation arose in Korematsu v. United States, where, as in 
Hirabayashi, the Court upheld the security measures, holding that the 
government’s actions were not “beyond the war power of Congress and 
the Executive.”64 The Court had no doubt that most Japanese-Americans 
“were loyal to this country,” but agreed with military authorities that “it 
was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the 
disloyal.”65 This reasoning apparently had an arguably valid basis: 
The judgment that exclusion of the whole group was for the same 
reason a military imperative answers the contention that the exclusion 
was in the nature of group punishment based on antagonism to those of 
Japanese origin. That there were members of the group who retained 
loyalties to Japan has been confirmed by investigations made 
subsequent to the exclusion. Approximately five thousand American 
citizens of Japanese ancestry refused to swear unqualified allegiance to 
the United States and to renounce allegiance to the Japanese Emperor, 
and several thousand evacuees requested repatriation to Japan.66 
 
 61. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83. 
 62. Id. at 101. 
 63. Id. at 100-01. 
 64. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944). 
 65. Id. at 219-220. 
 66. Id. at 219. 
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Hirabayashi and Korematsu have since been harshly criticized by 
both the courts and civil liberties groups.67 Yet the underlying concept – 
that an emergent and genuine threat to the United States as a whole can 
supersede even important and fundamental rights – seems particularly 
relevant to considerations of airport security in light of September 11. 
Further, a number of significant differences exist between the Japanese 
internments of World War II and the recent calls for profiling at airports: 
• Different Players, Different Goals: Pearl Harbor was a 
military target, attacked by a military force. September 11 
marked the beginning of a “focus on attacks that yield 
significant destruction and high casualties, thus maximizing 
worldwide media attention and public anxiety.”68 Japan had 
hoped to disable America’s naval capacities with a one-time 
strike. Al-Qaeda extremists, on the other hand, adhere to 
“the international jihad movement”69 seeking the actual 
destruction – not merely disabling – of America. 
• Proportional Harm: Some Japanese were interned in camps 
during a substantial portion of World War II. Some were 
allowed to leave provided that they joined the military or 
relocate to the eastern and Midwestern portions of the United 
States.70 The degree of harm suffered by the Japanese was 
much more serious than what might be experienced by those 
who are profiled at airports.71 
• Sunset Provision: One of the most unjust attributes of the 
Japanese internment  episode was its open-endedness. A 
policy was formulated in the heat of the moment to get the 
Japanese into internment camps, but exit strategies took 
quite some time to develop and implement. Modification to 
current airport profiling procedures could include a “sunset 
provision” requiring that these measures expire unless 
Congress acts to extend them.72 
 
 67. See e.g., the criticisms of Hirabayashi in U.S. v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988); 
Blanton v. U.S., 94 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 1996); Estate of McKinney ex rel. McKinney v. U.S., 71 F.3d 
779 (9th Cir. 1995); Moody v. U.S., 874 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir. 1989); U.S. v. Craig, 907 F.2d 653 
(7th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988).  
 68. FBI, supra note 4, at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/watson020602.htm. 
 69. Id. 
 70. REHNQUIST, supra note 59, at 200-03. 
 71. As a recent article noted, “assuming these [profiling] procedures do work, it’s hard to 
argue that helping to avoid another Sept. 11 is not worth the imposition, which is pretty small: 
inconvenience and embarrassment, as opposed to losing a job or getting lynched.” Kinsley, supra 
note 14, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=116347. 
 72. A sunset provision could also act as a safety valve in case the modified profiling 
procedures are ineffective or result in significant civil rights violations. 
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2.  DWB – “driving while black” 
Another controversial form of discrimination is “any action taken by 
a state trooper during a traffic stop that is based upon racial or ethnic 
stereotypes and that has the effect of treating minority motorists 
differently than non-minority motorists.”73 Such pretextual traffic stops 
have become known as DWB – “driving while black.”74 Police argue that 
profiling young black men is not a matter of racism, but of statistics. 
Though black males aged fifteen to twenty-four constitute only one 
percent of the population, they are responsible for up to twenty percent 
of violent crime.75 Critics of this practice argue “it is unfair . . . to visit 
disproportionate burdens upon one segment of the population, defined by 
its racial characteristics . . . because race is immutable and therefore 
cannot be altered to avoid unwanted disparate treatment.”76 Others 
acknowledge the validity of the statistics cited by police in defense of 
DWB, but still say that profiling is not a part of good police work. 
“Racial profiling poisons the water. It’s one of the things that makes 
racial minorities distrust the police and that makes their work more 
difficult,” says Harvard law professor Randall Kennedy. “Even if it’s 
true, if it works . . . it’s too socially horrible for America.”77 Such 
arguments would also seem applicable to persons subjected to increased 
scrutiny in airports. 
Many other arguments suggest valid and reasonable objections to 
DWB profiling.78 Yet, as with the Japanese internment camps, several 
significant distinctions arise between DWB and profiling race, gender, 
and age at airports. Columnist Stuart Taylor argues, 
[DWB] should be deemed unconstitutional even when there is a 
statistically valid basis for believing that it will help catch more drug 
dealers or violent criminals. . . . This benefit is far outweighed by the 
costs: Such racial profiling is hard to distinguish from—and sometimes 
involves—plain old racist harassment of groups that have long 
 
 73. White v. Williams, 179 F. Supp. 2d 405, 410 (D.N.J. 2002). 
 74. Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 75. John Stossel, Rethinking Racial Profiling: How the Attacks Have Changed Views, ABC 
NEWS  (Oct. 3, 2001) http://abcnews.go.com/sections/2020/2020/2020_011002_racial 
profiling_stossel. html. Interestingly, this particular issue may not have significant support in the 
black community. In a recent poll, two out of three NAACP members answered “no” when asked 
“Should black cops put pressure on Bush to back anti-racial profiling bills?” See NAACP, Poll 
Results, at (last visited Mar. 26, 2002) http://www.naacp.org/polls/results.php. 
 76. Sherry F. Colb, The New Face of Racial Profiling: How Terrorism Affects The Debate, at 
(Oct. 10, 2001) http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20011010.html. 
 77. Stossel, supra note 75, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/2020/2020/2020_011002_racial 
profiling_stossel.html. 
 78. See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While 
Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (Dec 1999). 
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experienced discrimination at every stage of the criminal justice 
process. It subjects thousands of innocent people to the kind of 
humiliation that characterizes police states. It hurts law enforcement in 
the long run by fomenting fear and distrust among potential witnesses, 
tipsters, and jurors. It is rarely justified by any risk of imminent 
violence. And it makes a mockery of conservative preachings that the 
Constitution is colorblind.79 
Taylor goes on to note four differences between DWB and airport 
profiling: 
• The rationale for airport profiling (preventing mass murder) 
is infinitely more important than the rationale behind DWB 
profiling (finding illegal drugs or guns).80 
• A virulent perversion of Islam is, so far, the only mass 
movement in the world so committed to mass-murdering 
Americans that its fanatics are willing to kill themselves in 
the process.81 
• This movement includes people who have lived legally in 
America for years (some of whom may be citizens), so the 
risk of weapons being smuggled onto airliners cannot be 
eliminated by giving special scrutiny only to foreign 
nationals.82 
Additional distinctions between these two practices further 
demonstrate the plausibility of encouraging one (airport profiling) while 
condemning the other (DWB): 
• DWB is singularly race-based, which contravenes both the 
letter and the spirit of the Constitution. Airport profiling 
takes multiple factors into account, such as when the ticket 
was purchased, how the subject responds to questions, etc. 
• Police employ DWB profiling primarily as a drug 
interdiction technique. Because the vast majority of such 
interdictions yield a very small quantity of drugs, their social 
impact is insignificant (although the aggregate result can 
have a substantial effect). Airport profiling, on the other 
hand, seeks to eliminate criminal acts that, though singular 
and isolated, will have a significant impact on our society. 
 Some empirical evidence exists to justify both the World War II 
internment of ethnic Japanese and the more recent practice of profiling 
 
 79. Taylor, supra note 44 at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2001-09-25.htm. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. Legal proscriptions against discrimination notwithstanding, there is no logical reason 
to consider nationality but not race, gender, and age. 
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black motorists. Nevertheless, the costs of these practices far outweigh 
their benefits. The same cannot be said for airport profiling. The crime to 
be averted is a significant state interest. A profiling system incorporating 
multiple factors – including race, gender, and age – can avoid most, if 
not all, of the criticisms leveled against previous single- or dual-factor 
profiles. 
D.  Examples of Rational Discrimination 
State-endorsed discrimination is hardly a phenomenon restricted to 
World War II. American society currently tolerates – even advocates – a 
surprising number of openly discriminatory policies. These practices are 
justified by citing societal interests that presumably outweigh the harm 
suffered by those groups against which these policies discriminate. This 
section explores three examples of discriminatory practices that are 
either tolerated or openly encouraged and evaluates whether corollary 
arguments can be drawn between these social policies and profiling at 
airports. If rational discrimination can further societal interests such as 
education opportunities, employment opportunities, and military 
cohesiveness, then the law can certainly accommodate rational 
discrimination in matters of airport security. 
1.  Affirmative action 
Affirmative action is a general term referring to social policies 
calling for “minorities and women to be given special consideration in 
employment, education and contracting decisions.”83 Supporters of this 
policy claim to be “dedicated to the advancement of affirmative action, 
equal opportunity and the elimination of discrimination on the basis of 
race, gender, ethnic background or any other criterion that deprives 
people of opportunities to live and work.”84 Affirmative action suggests 
that the remedy for America’s “long history of racial and sexual 
discrimination”85 is, ironically, contemporary preferences based on race 
or sex: 
In its modern form, affirmative action can call for an admissions 
officer faced with two similarly qualified applicants to choose the 
minority over the white, or for a manager to recruit and hire a qualified 
woman for a job instead of a man. Affirmative action decisions are 
 
 83. Dan Froomkin, Affirmative Action Under Attack, WASH. POST (Oct. 1998) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/affirm/affirm.htm. 
 84. American Association for Affirmative Action, Welcome to Affirmativeaction.org  (last 
visited March 26, 2002) http://www.affirmativeaction.org/. 
 85. Froomkin, supra note 83, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/ 
special/affirm/affirm.htm. 
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generally not supposed to be based on quotas, nor are they supposed to 
give any preference to unqualified candidates. And they are not supposed 
to harm anyone through “reverse discrimination.”86 
Scrutiny of the comparative costs and benefits of affirmative action 
is beyond the scope of this paper.87 That it is a form of intentional, state-
endorsed discrimination, however, is beyond question. If peacetime 
initiatives may use discriminatory criteria to further racial equality, 
should not wartime initiatives similarly use rationally discriminatory 
criteria to further “our national defense?”88 
2.  Military discrimination: homosexuals; women in certain combat roles 
Military service “is fundamentally different from civilian life,”89 and 
therefore governed by a modified form of jurisprudence. Persons in the 
armed forces are subject to “the Uniform Code of Military Justice and 
other statutory provisions . . . to which may be added the unwritten 
common law of the usage and custom of military service as well as 
regulations and authorized by the President as Commander in Chief of 
the Armed Forces.”90 This body of law, fully recognized by civil courts 
in both times of peace and of war,91 provides two more examples of 
state-endorsed discrimination: the exclusion of women from certain 
combat roles and prohibition against homosexuals serving in any military 
capacity. 
The United States “has more women in its military than any other 
nation,” yet women are still barred from most combat positions.92 This 
prohibition stems from the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. There are voluminous legal articles available on this subject. See e.g. Richard Delgado & 
Jean Stefancic, California’s Racial History and Constitutional Rationales for Race-Conscious 
Decision Making in Higher Education, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1521 (2000); Robert J. Donahue, Racial 
Diversity as a Compelling Governmental Interest, 30 IND. L. REV. 523 (1997); Dinesh D’Souza & 
Christopher Edley, Jr., Affirmative Action Debate: Should Race-based Affirmative Action be 
Abandoned as a National Policy?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 425 (1996); Lino Graglia, Affirmative Action: 
Have Race- and Gender-Conscious Remedies Outlived Their Usefulness? Yes: Reverse 
Discrimination Serves No One, A.B.A. J. May 1995, at 40; Jeremy Moeser, Hopwood v. Texas: The 
Beginning of the End for Racial Preference Programs in Higher Education, 48 MERCER L. REV. 941 
(1997); L. Darnell Weeden, Yo, Hopwood, Sayinging No to Race-Based Affirmative Action is the 
Right Thing to Do from an Afrocentric Perspective, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 533 (1996-1997). 
 88. Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). 
 89. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (1994). 
 90. Legal Information Institute, Military Law: An Overview  (Mar. 26, 2002) 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/military.html. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Lucinda J. Peach, Women at War: The Ethics of Women in Combat, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. 
L. & POL’Y 199, (Spring 1994). 
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1948,93 which both advanced and limited women’s opportunities in the 
armed forces. This Act accomplished four things: 
• It gave women permanent status in the military. 94 
• It established that women could constitute two percent of all 
enlisted personnel, and it limited the number of female 
officers to ten percent of the total female enlisted strength.95 
• It limited women’s role in the military by excluding women 
from combat duties, combat units, and combat ships. (The 
Act allowed each branch of service considerable leeway in 
determining which assignments it would categorize as 
“combat” or “combat-support.”)96 
Women, however, are not alone when it comes to discriminatory 
military policies. Persons who “demonstrate a propensity or intent to 
engage in homosexual acts”97 are prohibited from serving in the Armed 
Forces at all. In November 1992, President-Elect Clinton announced that 
he planned to lift the military’s long-standing ban on gays and lesbians.98 
An extended debate on the issue culminated in a July 1993 compromise, 
known as “don’t ask, don’t tell,” allowing homosexuals to serve in the 
armed forces “as long as they did not proclaim their homosexuality or 
engage in homosexual conduct.”99 This policy also required that military 
commanders not try to find out the sexual orientation of personnel.100 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently declined to hear cases 
involving homosexuals being discharged from the military.101 
The armed forces discriminate, in varying degrees, against women, 
homosexuals, and even men.102 Regardless of the relative merits of these 
policies and their underlying justifications, their existence alone is 
sufficient to demonstrate that the Constitution can accommodate 
reasoned, rational discrimination in certain circumstances. 
 
 93. Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub.L.No. 80-625, 62 Stat. 368 
(1948). 
 94. Pamela R. Jones, Women in the Crossfire: Should The Court Allow It?, 78 CORNELL L. 
REV. 252 (1993). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15). 
 98. Facts on File, Issues and Controversies: Gays in the Military  (Mar. 6, 1998) http://www. 
facts.com/icof/i00062.htm. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Holmes v. California Army Nat. Guard, 525 U.S. 1067 (1999); Richenberg v. Cohen, 
522 U.S. 807 (1997); Thomasson v. Perry, 519 U.S. 948 (1996). 
 102. The current system for military draft inducts only men, a practice which has been upheld 
by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
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3.  Federally funded gender/age discrimination in Louisiana 
“State highway safety officials in Louisiana in November 2001 
announced they received a $700,000 federal grant to help crack down on 
two groups of chronic violators of the state’s seat belt law: drivers and 
passengers of pick-up trucks, and all male drivers and passengers 
between 18 and 55.”103 Louisiana Highway Safety Commission 
Executive Director James Champagne noted that state and federal studies 
have consistently shown that pick-up drivers and all male drivers are less 
likely to buckle up than any other groups of drivers or front-seat 
passengers. “We will be looking at all male drivers, especially those who 
drive pickup trucks who refuse to buckle up.” 104 Champagne also plans 
on targeting male pickup drivers 
“from the Florida Parishes to the New Orleans area to the Houma and 
Thibodaux area, [because] that’s where 65 percent of the pickups in the 
state are.” Asked if the targeting of males and pickup drivers and 
passengers is profiling of a certain group, Champagne said, 
“Absolutely . . . [The lack of seat belt use] is a gender problem. It is a 
male problem in all parts of the state. It is an 18-to-55 (year-olds) 
problem.”105 
 
Rather than couch this discriminatory practice in safer terms, Mr. 
Champagne openly acknowledges that he is profiling a certain group of 
people based on their gender, age, residence, and type of vehicle, and he 
is doing so at government expense. While his application of the law may 
be ultimately misguided, his methodology seems fairly logical. He has 
approached the problematic behavior with no thoughts of special 
treatment – positive or negative – to those participating in it. 
E.  Profiling at Ports of Entry: Three Examples 
The propriety and constitutionality of race, gender, or age 
discrimination must be determined according the context in which such 
discrimination occurs. The following section describes two situations 
where profiling procedures which included consideration of race worked. 
 
 103. Ed Anderson, Police to Harness Seat Belt Scofflaws, TIMES-PICAYUNE  (Nov. 10, 2001) 
http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/capital/index.ssf?/newsstory/drive10.html. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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1.  Ahmed Rassam 
In late 1999, customs officials in Port Angeles, Washington were on 
the lookout for Middle Eastern men when they stopped Ahmed Rassam, 
an Algerian, after he crossed into the United States from Canada.106 A 
search of his car yielded bomb-making materials that prosecutors later 
said were intended for an attack on a Los Angeles airport.107 
Investigators say the materials were similar to those used in attacks on 
the American embassies in Africa. Rassam now faces 140 years in jail 
and is said to be giving officials valuable information about Usama Bin 
Laden’s terrorist network.108 “So,” notes John Stossel, “profiling 
worked.”109 
2.  Richard Reid 
During a December 2001 flight from Paris to Miami, a flight 
attendant noticed Richard Reid – a British citizen and convert to Islam – 
trying to ignite the soles of his shoes, which turned out to be made of 
explosives. The flight attendant and other passengers succeeded in 
subduing him.110 Mr. Reid also aroused the suspicion of airline 
employees in Paris’s DeGaulle airport when he purchased a one-way 
ticket in cash and did not check any luggage. The CEO of American 
Airlines, Don Carty, stated, “Our people brought the passenger to the 
attention of French authorities, and it was only after those authorities 
cleared him, that he was allowed to board the flight on Saturday.”111 
Despite being singled out for questioning twice, French authorities 
eventually let Reid board the aircraft.112 
This incident is an important lesson in several ways. First, Richard 
Reid was not subjected to an administered and controlled profiling 
procedure, so the French authorities had no reasonable grounds to detain 
him. A profiling process could very well have resolved this problem. 
Second, this incident demonstrates the necessity of scrutinizing both 
objective characteristics (such as purchasing a one-way ticket with cash) 
and subjective observations (such as suspicious behavior). Finally, this 
 
 106. Stossel, supra note 75, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/2020/2020/2020_011002_ 
racialprofiling_stossel.html. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. CNN, Authorities: Alleged Shoe Bomber Did Not Act Alone  (Jan. 26, 2002) 
http://asia.cnn.com/2002/US/01/25/reid.candiotti/. 
 111. Lisa Stark, Patching Up Security Holes, ABC NEWS (Dec. 24, 2001)  
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/DailyNews/shoebomb_security011224.html . 
 112. Id. 
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event demonstrates the differences, both in rationale and implementation, 
between rational airport profiling and antagonistic profiling. Richard 
Reid was not scrutinized because of his race,113 but because he 
demonstrated several characteristics that, taken together, aroused 
suspicion.114 
IV. CHANGES IN AIRPORT SECURITY MEASURES 
There is no silver bullet or quick fix for terrorism. No single program 
or agency can protect U.S. interests from groups so enthralled with the 
prospect of our destruction. America can and should, however, continue 
to improve security measures at airports. This section evaluates some of 
the changes taking place in airport security, including the profiling 
procedures currently in place. 
A.  Airport Security Federalization Act 
In November 2001, President Bush signed the Airport Security 
Federalization Bill of 2001 into law. On January 18, 2002, airports across 
the country implemented the first security measures designed to 
“improve security at airports by requiring airlines to screen bags and 
travelers for explosives, either through the use of high-tech bomb x-ray 
devices, bag matching, random searches, manual searches or bomb-
sniffing dogs.”115  One of the provisions of the Act is requires that a 
computer-assisted passenger prescreening system “will be used to screen 
all passengers, rather than just those who check in at a ticket counter.” 116 
B.  On-Site Security Measures: Profiling 
In addition to indiscriminate security measures such as metal 
detectors and baggage screening, airport profiling “permits investigators 
to correlate a number of distinct data items in order to assess how close a 
person . . . comes to a predetermined characterization or model of 
infraction. The modal characteristics and behavior patterns of known 
violations . . . are determined relative to the characteristics of others 
 
 113. “And who is Richard Reid? A Saudi? An Iraqi? An Afghan? Well, not exactly. Reid was 
born in Bromley, Kent. His mother is British and his father believed to be of Jamaican origin.”  
James Thurgood, A Breeding Ground for Terror (last visited Nov. 13, 2002) http://www.spearhead-
uk.com/0201-jt.html. 
 114. This is not to say that race shouldn’t be considered, but rather that it should not be the 
sole or predominating factor in profiling methods. 
 115. John Whitehead, Terror In Our Airports (Jan. 26, 2002) http://www.worldnetdaily.com/ 
news/article.asp?article_id=26211. 
 116. Id. 
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presumed to be nonviolators.”117 Suspected hijackers are profiled through 
a comparison between these two groups. The most common profiling 
model is “a simple laundry list of ‘red flag’ characteristics. As more and 
more of these occur the case in question becomes more suspect. A 
second, more in-depth, investigation is then carried out to determine if a 
case that has been flagged as suspicious actually involves the 
violation.”118 
The modifications to profiling procedures suggested in this paper 
help avoid the pitfalls inherent in other models (such as DWB). A 
profiling process that incorporates all potentially useful factors is useful 
in preserving civil liberties because no single indicator is definitive. 
Rather, “their joint appearance is thought to be associated with an 
increased probability that a violation will occur or has occurred.”119 For 
example, “there is nothing illegal or exceptional about being [a middle-
eastern] male, purchasing a one-way airline ticket, paying for it with 
cash, and obtaining the ticket at the last minute at the airport. But 
analysis suggests that when these factors occur together, the chances of a 
skyjacking attempt are increased.”120 In other words, as the court in U.S. 
v. Lopez stated, while no single screening technique “can by itself 
completely protect the flying public – without creating an objectionable 
level of disturbance and inconvenience – probabilities are increased by 
combining several approaches, thus sufficiently reducing the size of the 
population which must ultimately be physically interfered with to a 
practicable and socially acceptable level.”121 
C.  Suggested Modifications to Current Profiling Techniques 
So-called “hijacker profiles”122 are intentionally kept secret to 
prevent circumvention of identified hijacker characteristics. However, 
testimony from cases which have challenged these procedures 
demonstrate that hijacker profiles probably include information on how 
the ticket is purchased (i.e. whether the ticket is one-way,123 purchased 
with cash,124 purchased on the same day as the flight,125 etc.). Further, the 
 
 117. Gary T. Marx & Nancy Reichman, Routinizing the Discovery of Secrets: Computers as 
Informants, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 423 (available at (visited March 26, 2002) 
http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/secrets.html). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. U.S. v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
 122. Charles G. Slepian, Security at Domestic Aviation Facilities  (last visited Nov. 13, 2002) 
http://www.frac.com/airline/ Domestic_Aviation_Facilities96.asp. 
 123. U.S. v. Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1974). 
 124. Four of the nineteen September 11 terrorists paid with cash. FBI, Press Release – 9/27/01 
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court in Lopez found profiling and its attendant anti-hijacking procedures 
to be constitutionally valid where: 
• The profile has certain established characteristics in which 
hijackers differ significantly from air-traveling public. 126 
• Such characteristics are easily observed by airport personnel 
without exercising judgment.127 
• The profile does not use characteristics which discriminate 
against any group on the basis of religion, origin, political 
views, or race.128 
Any addition to the profile which may introduce “an ethnic element 
for which there is no experimental basis [raises] serious equal protection 
problems . . . [and destroys] the essential neutrality and objectivity of the 
approved profile.”129 
The premise upon which the court in Lopez relied in barring 
consideration of race is outmoded in regards to airport security. The 
requisite “experimental basis” for introducing consideration of race (and, 
presumably, gender and age) into profiling techniques was created on 
September 11, 2001. “One hundred percent of the people who have 
hijacked airliners for the purpose of mass-murdering Americans have 
been Arab men.”130  Other characteristics131 which are currently subject 
to profiling are not nearly as determinative or as useful for predictive 
purposes. Therefore the FTSA should modify current profiling 
procedures to incorporate race, gender, and age into the list of factors 
which may trigger heightened scrutiny. These modified procedures 
should be implemented with a sunset provision to ensure that such 
measures do not last longer than the current circumstances require. 
In order to ensure the constitutional and practical feasibility of such 
modifications,  airport security personnel should receive careful, precise 
training to incorporate observations of these factors into their security 
measures. Columnist Stuart Taylor suggests that this change of policy 
could even be beneficial to minorities: 
The [Bush] Administration cannot and should not cloak its profiling 
policy in ambiguity . . . Unless the security people on the ground are 
told clearly what they should and should not do, they may engage in 
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more (or less) racial profiling than safety requires. And if the 
Administration uses racial profiling while pretending to reject it, the 
message to police and citizens around the country will be that it’s OK, 
as long as you lie about it.132 
These modified procedures will expand the discretion given to 
airport security personnel in regards to profiling, but the courts have 
already demonstrated a willingness to allow such latitude. For example, 
the broad discretion given to security personnel to execute searches 
already extends to such amorphous grounds as “the mere presence of a 
large, unidentifiable dark object in an x-ray picture of carryon 
luggage,”133 a defendant’s “suspicious activity in the airport lounge 
area,”134 even a “mere or unsupported suspicion.”135 A rational, openly-
administered and monitored profiling system that includes consideration 
of race, gender, and age, is not nearly as expansive and far more 
objective than “dark objects”136 or “mere suspicion.”137 
V.  VALID CONCERNS 
 There have been concerns aired over expansion or use of profiling.  
Critics argue that profiling is a slippery slope that will result in 
significant civil rights violations, and that such measures will be 
ineffective. 
As an example, Ashraf Khan was born in Pakistan and is currently an 
American citizen. He is not an Arab.138 Not long ago he was seated on a 
Delta Airlines flight to attend his brother’s wedding. He claims a Delta 
pilot asked him to deplane, saying, “Mr. Khan, I want you to pick up 
your luggage inside the plane and I don’t want you to fly with me on this 
flight. Me and my crew made a decision that we are not secure flying 
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with you.”139 Delta later issued a statement saying it is wrong to act 
solely based on race.140 
Profiling at airports constitutes a mere fraction of the efforts to 
improve security since September 11, yet remains a subject of vigorous 
debate. Mr. Khan’s experience typifies the legitimate concerns aroused 
when race, gender, and age are injected into profiling modalities. 
According to statistics from the ACLU and other sources, we are already 
grappling with racial profiling in airport screening: 
• Sixty-seven percent of the passengers subjected to personal 
searches upon entering the United States were people of 
color.141 
• Black and Latino Americans were four to nine times as 
likely as white Americans to be X-rayed after being frisked 
or patted down.142 
• Black women are more likely than any other U.S. citizens to 
be strip-searched.143 
Some opponents of airport profiling have suggested plausible 
slippery slope consequences which may eventually result from profiling 
race, gender, and age: “What about the dangers of terrorists smuggling 
bombs or guns or box cutters onto buses or trains or subways or bridges, 
or into tunnels or crowded stadiums or office buildings or schools or the 
Capitol or Disneyland?”144 Another opponent of airport profiling 
compares it to a genie escaping from a bottle: 
Another problem with this approach is where does the profiling stop? 
It’s fine to say, well, just at airports, but . . . that’s never the case—once 
you let it out, it is very hard to put the profiling genie back in the bottle. 
“Arab-looking men who drive vans and trucks will be profiled as well 
as Arabs who access the Internet from public libraries; and those who 
buy fertilizer at the Home Depot for their backyards. As for Arab-
looking men who decide to take flying lessons, they should forget 
about it.”145 
This is a reasonable concern, but the unique circumstances in which 
profiling will take place make this type of scenario unlikely. First, the 
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FTSA must limit application of profiling measures to areas within its 
jurisdiction: airports and, perhaps eventually, to border crossings. 
Second, profiling is already an openly and strictly administered 
procedure. Victims of inappropriate profiling would be free to seek 
redress for their injuries in the courts. Such a possibility would help to 
ensure fair, rational application of profiling guidelines. Third, this 
modified profiling system would have a sunset provision. If the threat of 
terrorist attacks subsides, so would those measures adopted as a response 
to them. 
In addition to these slippery slope arguments, some opponents of 
profiling have suggested that such a system is rendered ineffective by our 
pluralistic society. Columnist John Derbyshire noted the difficulties of 
deciding who is OMEA (“of middle eastern appearance”146) and who is 
not: 
OMEA is perhaps a more dubious description even than “black” or 
“Hispanic.” You can see the difficulties by scanning the photographs of 
the September 11 hijackers published in our newspapers. A few are 
unmistakably OMEA. My reaction on seeing the photograph of the first 
to be identified, Mohamed Atta, was that he looked exactly like my 
own mental conception of an Arab terrorist. On the other hand, one of 
his companions on AA Flight 11, Wail al-Shehri, is the spitting image 
of a boy I went to school with — a boy of entirely English origins, 
whose name was Hobson. Ahmed al-Nami (UA Flight 93) looks like a 
Welsh punk rocker. And so on.147 
This argument depends on the assumption that profiling a 
passenger’s race would be based solely on visual markers. This argument 
also perpetuates the incorrect assumption that race would be the only 
profiled characteristic. “Of middle eastern appearance”148 is a rather 
broad category, and one susceptible to mistakes in judgment. However, a 
profile that considers race and gender and age and other factors (when 
the ticket was purchased, if the passenger paid cash, etc.) substantially 
mitigates the chances of error. As with any security measure, profiling is 
not an exact science. Metal detectors, bomb-sniffing dogs, and baggage 
screening machines have all resulted in false alarms, yet no one suggests 
that such deficiencies invalidate these precautions. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Profiling race, gender, and age is a sensitive topic in our society, 
particularly in relation to September 11. Many of the arguments both for 
and against this policy apparently derive from knee-jerk reactions to 
anything resembling our discriminatory past. And yet frank discussion of 
airport profiling may ultimately prove beneficial. As columnist John 
Derbyshire noted, “Crises like [September 11] can generate hysteria . . . 
but they can also have a clarifying effect on our outlook, sweeping away 
the wishful thinking of easier times, exposing the hollowness of 
relativism and moral equivalence, and forcing us to the main point.”149 
Terrorism is a particularly horrible crime. The use – or threat – of 
deadly violence against innocent civilians is “inherently . . . 
intolerable”150 and “deserves absolute condemnation regardless of the 
perpetrator or the motive.”151 Airport security measures constitute a 
relatively small, though very important, part of our response to 
September 11. Rational profiling of airline passengers – including 
scrutiny of race, gender, and age – may be “an essential component . . . 
of the effort to ensure that we see no more mass-murder-suicide 
hijackings.”152 Columnist Stuart Taylor suggests a scenario which 
perhaps helps “sweep away the wishful thinking of easier times.”153 
[P]lease try a thought experiment: A few weeks hence, or a year hence, 
you are about to board a cross-country flight. Glancing around the 
departure lounge, you notice lots of white men and women; some black 
men and women; four young, casually dressed Latino-looking men; and 
three young, well-dressed Arab-looking men. Would your next thought 
be, “I sure do hope that the people who let me through security without 
patting me down didn’t violate Ashcroft’s policy by frisking any of 
those three guys”? Or more like, “I hope somebody gave those three a 
good frisking to make sure they didn’t have box cutters”? If the former, 
perhaps you care less than I do about staying alive. If the latter, you 
favor racial profiling—at least of Arab-looking men boarding 
airliners.154 
Richard Kimble in the movie “The Fugitive” utilized all available 
information to find the one-armed man. He narrowed his search to adult, 
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one-armed males. Had Kimble failed to take such characteristics into 
consideration, he would never have found his wife’s murderer. 
Narrowing the pool of potential terrorist suspects at airports by profiling 
race, gender, age, and other considerations could significantly improve 
our chances of apprehending terrorists before they act. While some of 
these measures may prove inconvenient, such costs must be weighed 
against the greater societal interest. 
R. Spencer Macdonald 
 
